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Abstract Risk-limiting post election audits guarantee a high probability of cor-
recting incorrect election results, independent of why the result was incorrect.
Ballot-polling audits select cast ballots at random and interpret those ballots as
evidence for and against the reported result, continuing this process until either
they support the reported result, or they fall back to a full manual recount. For
elections with digitised scanning and counting of ballots, a ballot-level compar-
ison audit compares randomly selected digital ballots with their paper versions.
Discrepancies are referred to as errors, and are used to build evidence against or
in support of the reported result. Risk-limiting audits for first-past-the-post elec-
tions are well understood, and used in some US elections. We define a number
of approaches to ballot-polling and ballot-level comparison risk-limiting audits for
Instant Runoff Voting (IRV) elections. We show that for almost all real elections
for which data is available, we can perform a risk-limiting audit by looking at only
a small fraction of the total ballots (assuming no errors were made in the tallying
and distribution of votes). The techniques presented in this paper represent the
first practical techniques for conducting risk-limiting audits of IRV elections.
1 Introduction
Instant Runoff Voting (IRV) is a system of preferential voting in which voters rank
candidates in order of preference. IRV is used for all parliamentary lower house
elections in Australia, parliamentary elections in Fiji and Papua New Guinea,
presidential elections in Ireland and Bosnia/Herzogovinia, and local elections in
numerous locations world-wide, including the UK and United States. Each voter
casts a ballot in which they rank a set of available candidates in order of preference.
In an election with candidates c1, c2, and c3, a ballot with the ranking [c1, c2, c3]
expresses a first preference for candidate c1, a second preference for c2, and a third
for c3. Voters may or may not be required to number every candidate on the ballot.
A ballot may therefore be a partial ordering over candidates (e.g., [c2, c1]).
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The tallying of ballots in an IRV election proceeds by first giving each ballot to
its first ranked candidate. Each candidate has a pile of ballots (called a tally pile),
with the number of ballots in their pile called their tally. The candidate with the
smallest tally (i.e., the candidate with the smallest number of ballots in their tally
pile) is eliminated. The ballots in their tally pile are redistributed to subsequent,
less preferred candidates on the ballot. Elimination proceeds in this fashion, until
a single candidate w remains, who is declared the winner.
The scanning and digitisation of ballots, and the use of automated counting
software for computing the outcomes of elections, is becoming more commonplace.
In light of recent attempts by foreign powers to interfere in electoral processes in
the US (Norden and Vandewalker, 2017), there is a growing need for efficient and
statistically sound electoral audits. Risk Limiting Audits (Lindeman and Stark,
2012) (RLAs) provide strong statistical evidence that the reported outcome of an
election is correct, or revert to a manual recount if it is wrong. The probability
that the audit fails to detect a wrong outcome is bounded by a risk limit. An
RLA with a risk limit of 1%, for example, has at most a 1% chance of failing to
detect that a reported election outcome is wrong. In this paper we present several
methods for undertaking both ballot-polling and ballot-level comparison RLAs of
IRV elections, and compare the auditing effort required by each on a set of real
IRV election instances. We show that we can design RLAs for IRV elections that,
in general, require only a small fraction of cast ballots to be sampled.
Risk limiting ballot-polling and ballot-level comparison audits have been devel-
oped for first-past-the-post (FPTP) or k-winner plurality elections (Lindeman et al.,
2012; Stark, 2010). In such elections, the k candidates with the most votes are de-
clared winners. A ballot-polling RLA of such an election randomly samples the
paper ballots cast (or records produced). As each ballot is examined, we update
a series of statistics representing hypotheses that any loser actually received more
votes than any winner. Once we have seen enough ballots to be confident that
all these hypotheses can be rejected, the reported outcome is correct and the au-
dit concludes. At any point, the audit can fall back to a full manual recount, for
example if it is taking too long or has examined a large number of ballots. The
audit is designed so that the probability of concluding with acceptance, when the
result is in fact wrong, is at most the risk limit α. Ballot-level comparison RLAs
are applicable in settings where paper ballots have been scanned and digitised, or
a paper-based electronic voting system has been used, producing an index that
allows individual electronic ballots to be matched to the paper ballot they repre-
sent. Each sampled ballot is compared to its corresponding electronic record. An
erroneous ballot is one that does not match its electronic record. These errors are
then used to update a similar set of statistics representing hypotheses that the
reported election outcomes are actually wrong.
In this paper we present several methods for undertaking both ballot-polling
and ballot-level comparison RLAs of IRV elections. Our ballot-polling RLAs adapt
a ballot-polling RLA method (BRAVO), designed for first-past-the-post (FPTP)
or k-winner plurality elections (Lindeman et al., 2012), to IRV. Our ballot-level
comparison RLAs adapt a comparison-based RLA method (MACRO), similarly
designed for FPTP elections (Stark, 2010), to IRV.
Of the set of approaches we present for undertaking ballot-polling and ballot-
level comparison RLAs of IRV elections, the most straightforward views, and au-
dits, each round of an IRV election as a multiple-winner plurality election. This
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approach has previously been considered (but not evaluated) by Sarwate et al.
(2013). A more efficient method, requiring fewer ballot samples, seeks to prove that
the reported winner could not have been eliminated before any other candidate.
The former approach is designed to confirm the correctness of each elimination
in the IRV counting process, while the latter aims to to confirm only that the
reported winner of the election is correct.
The final method we consider uses a custom algorithm, RAIRE, to generate a
collection of assertions to audit for a given IRV election. These assertions corre-
spond to properties that, if confirmed with a given degree of statistical confidence,
confirm that the reported winner is the correct one to the given degree of statistical
confidence. An example of such an assertion is that “candidate c has a higher tally
than candidate c′ in the context where candidates C have been eliminated”. We
show that we can apply BRAVO and MACRO to audit each of these assertions.
Our RAIRE algorithm is designed to find the set of such assertions requiring the
least estimated auditing effort to prove.
We compare each of the presented approaches for IRV risk limiting audits
in terms of the number of ballot polls required to audit a number of real election
instances with varying risk limits. We experimentally consider audits where all bal-
lots are indeed recorded correctly, and elections where discrepancies exist between
paper ballots and their electronic records. Our evaluation compares the relative
efficiency of ballot-polling and comparison-based RLAs, in terms of the level of
auditing effort required. In the context of FPTP elections, comparison RLAs re-
quire fewer ballot samples, in general, to confirm the correctness of an election
result. This is because they can assess, and make use of, the differences between
reported and actual individual ballots, a significant source of extra information.
This paper is structured as follows. Related work is described in Section 2.
Required background and definitions are presented in Section 3. Section 4 de-
scribes the ballot-polling (Lindeman et al., 2012) and ballot-level comparison-
based RLAs Stark (2010) upon which our IRV audits are based. We present our
IRV ballot-polling and ballot-level comparison RLAs in Sections 5 and 6, and
evaluate their efficiency in Section 7.
2 Related Work
Post-election audits are a key measure for increasing both security in our electoral
systems, and public confidence in the integrity of our elections (Norden and Vandewalker,
2017). Risk-limiting audits of reported election results against paper ballots (or
records) represent the current best-practice for verifying the integrity of an election
(Rivest and Stark, 2017), and a central component of conducting evidence-based
elections (Lindeman, 2017).
There is a growing literature on the use of risk-limiting audits (RLAs) for
auditing the outcome of varying types of election (see e.g. Stark (2009a); Hall et al.
(2009); Checkoway et al. (2010); Benaloh et al. (2011); Lindeman et al. (2012);
Stark and Lindeman (2012); Sarwate et al. (2013)). RLAs have been applied to a
number of plurality (first-past-the-post) elections, including four 2008 elections in
California (Hall et al., 2009) and elections in over 50 Colorado counties in 2017
(Lindeman et al., 2018). Stark and Teague (2014) present RLAs for D’Hondt (and
similar) elections, applicable in a number of European countries such as Norway,
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Germany, Luxembourg, and Denmark. General auditing procedures designed to
enhance electoral integrity have been outlined by Antonyan et al. (2009). The
BRAVO ballot-polling RLA (Lindeman et al., 2012), designed for FPTP elections,
forms the basis of our IRV ballot-polling audits. The ballot-level comparison RLA
presented by Stark (2010) forms the basis of our IRV comparison RLAs.
A straightforward RLA of an IRV election can be conducted by treating each
IRV round as a separate FPTP election. This idea was described by Sarwate et al.
(2013) although not explored in algorithmic detail. Sarwate et al. (2013) consider
two additional approaches for designing a comparison audit of an IRV election.
The first determines whether replacing an erroneous ballot with its correct rep-
resentation changes the margin of victory of the election. The second samples K
ballots and checks whether the number of erroneous ballots in the sample exceeds a
threshold whose value is based on the election’s margin of victory. We demonstrate,
however, that we can more efficiently audit an IRV election outcome by simply
verifying that the reported winner was not defeated by any other candidate.
An alternative to RLAs are Bayesian audits, proposed by Rivest and Shen
(2012). Each ballot is viewed as one of a set of possible ballot types (i.e., the set
of all possible rankings over candidates). In an IRV election that requires voters
to rank all candidates on a ballot, this set contains n! rankings in a contest with
n candidates. In an election with m voters, an election profile is a sequence of m
ballot types. A Bayesian audit starts with a prior distribution on the set of possible
election profiles. This prior could indicate that each profile is as likely to be the
true election profile as all others, or that some profiles are more likely than others.
As ballots are sampled in a Bayesian audit, they are used to form a posterior
probability distribution over the set of possible profiles. Monte Carlo simulation
is applied to compute election outcomes across a large number of simulated pro-
files, drawn from this distribution. The number of simulated outcomes in which
the reported winner did not win defines an upset probability. The auditor may
terminate the audit when this upset probability falls below a defined threshold.
Bayesian audits can, in principle, be applied to any voting system.
The margin of victory (MOV) of the election provides an indication of how
many ballots will need to be sampled during a RLA. Elections with a smaller
MOV are likely to require more ballots to be sampled in an audit. Automatic
methods for computing electoral margins for IRV elections have been presented
by Magrino et al. (2011), Blom et al. (2016), and Beckert et al. (2016). We use
prior work for computing the MOV of an IRV election (Blom et al., 2016) as the
basis for the RAIRE algorithm. This algorithm is used to build a minimal set of
assertions to audit for a given IRV election that, if confirmed, confirm the reported
outcome of the election. The set of assertions is minimal in the sense that there
exists no other set of assertions that (i) requires fewer estimated ballot polls to
audit and (ii) confirms the reported outcome.
3 Preliminaries
3.1 First-past-the-post (FPTP)
In a single-winner FPTP election, a voter marks a single candidate on their ballot
when casting their vote. The candidate who receives the most votes is declared the
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Initially, all candidates remain standing (are not eliminated)
While there is more than one candidate standing
For every candidate c standing
Tally (count) the ballots in which c is the highest-ranked
candidate of those standing
Eliminate the candidate with the smallest tally
The winner is the one candidate not eliminated
Fig. 1: IRV (a.k.a. Alternate Vote or Ranked Choice Voting) counting procedure.
winner. The BRAVO ballot-polling RLAs (Lindeman et al., 2012), and MACRO
ballot-level comparison RLAs (Stark, 2010), are designed for k-winner FPTP con-
tests. A voter marks up to k candidates on their ballot, and the k candidates with
the highest number of votes are declared winners.
3.2 Instant Runoff Voting (IRV)
IRV is a form of preferential voting in which voters express a preference ordering
over a set of candidates on their ballot. The tallying of ballots proceeds by a series
of rounds (see Figure 1) in which the candidate with the smallest tally (number of
ballots in their tally pile) is eliminated, with the last remaining candidate declared
the winner. All ballots in an eliminated candidate’s tally pile are distributed to
the next most-preferred eligible candidate in their ranking. A candidate is eligible
if they have not yet been eliminated.
Definition 1 (IRV election) An IRV election is defined as a tuple ξ = (C,B)
where C is the set of available candidates, and B a multiset1 of ballots. Each
ballot b ∈ B is a sequence of candidates in C, with no duplicates, listed in order of
preference (most preferred to least preferred).
We refer to sequences of candidates π in list notation (e.g., π = [c1, c2, c3]), and
use such sequences to represent both ballots and the order in which candidates are
eliminated. We use the notation first(π) = π(1) to denote the first candidate in a
sequence π. In each round of vote counting, there are a current set of eliminated
candidates E and a current set of candidates still standing S = C \E. The winner
cw is the last standing candidate.
Each candidate c ∈ C has a tally pile of ballots. Ballots are added to this pile
upon the elimination of a candidate c′ ∈ C \ c, and are redistributed upon the
elimination of c. A candidate’s tally is equal to the number of ballots in their tally
pile. We use the concept of projection to formally define a candidate’s tally at any
stage in the IRV counting process.
Definition 2 Projection pS(π) We define the projection of a sequence π onto
a set S as the largest subsequence of π that contains only elements of S. (The
elements keep their relative order in π). For example:
p{c2,c3}([c1, c2, c4, c3]) = [c2, c3] and p{c2,c3,c4,c5}([c6, c4, c7, c2, c1]) = [c4, c2].
1 A multiset allows for the inclusion of duplicate items.
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Ranking Count
[c2, c3] 4000
[c1] 20000
[c3, c4] 9000
[c2, c3, c4] 6000
[c4, c1, c2] 15000
[c1, c3] 6000
(a)
Candidate Rnd1 Rnd2 Rnd3
c1 26000 26000 26000
c2 10000 10000 —
c3 9000 — —
c4 15000 24000 30000
t{c1,c2,c3,c4} t{c1,c2,c4} t{c1,c4}
(b)
Table 1: An example IRV election, stating (a) the number of ballots cast with each
listed ranking over four candidates, and (b) tallies after each round.
Definition 3 Tally tS(c) Given candidates S ⊆ C are still standing in an election
ξ = (C,B), the tally for a candidate c ∈ C, denoted tS(c), is defined as the number
of ballots b ∈ B for which c is the most-preferred candidate of those remaining.
Recall that pS(b) denotes the sequence of candidates mentioned in b that are also
in S. Square brackets have been used to denote a multiset.
tS(c) = | [b | b ∈ B, c = first(pS(b))] | (1)
Several of the auditing methods we propose in this paper make use of a candi-
date’s primary vote.
Definition 4 Primary vote f (c) The primary vote of candidate c ∈ C, denoted
f(c), is the number of ballots b ∈ B for which c is ranked highest.
Note that f(c) = tC(c).
f(c) = | [b | b ∈ B, c = first(b)] | (2)
Example 1 Consider the IRV election of Table 1. The tallies of c1, c2, c3, and c4, in
the 1st counting round are 26000, 10000, 9000, and 15000. These tallies represent
each candidate’s primary vote. Candidate c3 is eliminated, and 9000 ballots are
distributed to c4, who now has a tally of 24000. Candidate c2, on 10000 votes,
is eliminated next with 6000 of their ballots given to c4 (the remainder have no
subsequent preferences). Candidates c1 and c4 remain with tallies of 26000 and
30000. Candidate c1 is eliminated and c4 elected.
The aim of a RLA is to either gain evidence that the reported results are
correct (to some risk limit α) or to correct an incorrect result by falling back to a
manual recount. We distinguish between reported results (tallies and counts based
on digital ballot records) and the actual results which should have been calculated,
as represented in the paper ballot records. We use a tilde ∼ to refer to these actual
results. For example, f(c) is the recorded primary vote for candidate c and f˜(c) is
the actual primary vote for the candidate. Similarly, we refer to reported ballots
with B and actual ballots with B˜.
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4 Risk-limiting audits for FPTP
In this section, we describe the BRAVO and MACRO ballot-polling and ballot-
level comparison RLAs for k-winner FPTP elections. These methods form the
building blocks for our IRV RLAs (Sections 5 and 6). In a k-winner FPTP elec-
tion, the k candidates with the greatest tallies are elected. All winners are elected
simultaneously and there is no transfer of ballots. Given a set of C candidates
(|C| = n) there will be a set of W winners (|W| = k) and L losers (|L| = n− k).
Both BRAVO and MACRO are applicable in elections where each ballot may ex-
press a vote for one or more candidates. We describe these methods in the context
where each ballot expresses a vote for a single candidate, and where ballots are
sampled one at a time. This is the setting in which they will be simulated in our
evaluation. In practice, ballots are drawn in batches during an audit, with an esti-
mate of required auditing effort used to set the size of the initial sample. It would
be straightforward to adapt our IRV audits to operate in this setting.
Throughout this section we use the notation t(c) (t˜(c)) to denote the reported
(actual) number of ballots expressing a vote for candidate c.
4.1 BRAVO ballot-polling RLAs
Figure 2 outlines the steps involved in a BRAVO ballot-polling RLA for a k-
winner FPTP election (Lindeman et al., 2012) . A BRAVO audit independently
tests k(n − k) null hypotheses {t˜(w) ≤ t˜(l)}, one for each winner/loser pair. For
winner w and loser l, the hypothesis {t˜(w) ≤ t˜(l)} states that l has amassed at
least as many votes as w (i.e., that w does not actually beat l).
A statistic for each of these hypotheses, Twl, is maintained and updated when
a ballot is drawn that expresses a vote for w or l. Each Twl is initialised to 1, as
shown in Figure 2. When a ballot expressing a vote for winner w is drawn, the
Twl statistics for w and each l ∈ L are increased. When a ballot expressing a vote
for loser l is drawn, the Twl statistics for l and each w ∈ W are decreased. We
reject a given hypothesis once Twl exceeds a given threshold, equal to 1/α where
α is the risk limit of the audit. We can estimate for each hypothesis the number
of sampled ballots we expect will be required to reject it, assuming the announced
election counts are accurate.
Let pc be the proportion of recorded ballots B expressing a vote for candidate
c, i.e. pc = t(c)/|B|. Of the ballots expressing a vote for either candidate w or l,
the proportion of these expressing a vote for w is denoted swl.
swl =
pw
pw + pl
(3)
Lindeman et al. (2012) define theAverage Sample Number (ASN) for a BRAVO
audit with risk limit α – the number of ballots we expect we will need to sample
to reject the null hypothesis {t˜(w) ≤ t˜(l)} – as follows.
ASN ≃
ln(1/α) + 0.5ln(2swl)
(pw ln(2swl) + pl ln(2− 2swl))
(4)
To confirm the reported outcome of an election, BRAVO must reject W × L
null hypotheses. The expected number of ballot samples required to do this is
equal to the maximum of the ASNs for each hypothesis.
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bravo(B˜, W , L, α, M)
⊲ Initialise statistic Twl for each winner/loser pair
1 for(w ∈ W , l ∈ L)
2 Twl := 1
3 swl := t(w)/(t(w) + t(l))
4 H := W ×L
⊲ Initialise counter m recording number of ballots sampled thus far
5 m := 0
⊲ We randomly draw a ballot, updating our statistics Twl with each
ballot drawn, until a maximum number of ballots M have been drawn,
or we have rejected all |H| hypotheses
6 while(m < M ∧H 6= ∅)
7 Randomly draw a ballot b from B˜
8 m := m+ 1
9 if (b expresses a vote for a winner w′ ∈ W)
10 for((w′, l) ∈ H)
11 Tw′l := Tw′l × 2sw′l
12 if (Tw′l ≥ 1/α)
13 ⊲ We reject the null hypothesis {t˜(w′) ≤ t˜(l)}
14 H = H − {(w′, l)}
15 else if (b expresses a vote for a loser l′ ∈ L)
16 for((w, l′) ∈ H)
17 Twl′ := Twl′ × 2(1− swl′ )
18 if (H = ∅)
⊲ The reported outcome stands
19 return true
20 else
⊲ A full recount is required
21 return false
Fig. 2: A BRAVO RLA of a FPTP election with actual ballots B˜, declared winners
W and losers L, risk limit α, and limit on ballots checked M .
Example 2 Consider the first round of the IRV election of Example 1. If we view
this first round as a FPTP election with winners c1, c2, and c4, and loser c3, the
null hypotheses we need to reject are f˜(c1) ≤ f˜(c3), f˜(c2) ≤ f˜(c3), t˜(f4) ≤ f˜(c3).
Recall that f(c) and f˜(c) represent candidate c’s reported, and actual, tallies in the
first round of an IRV election. We calculate p1 = 26000/60000, p2 = 10000/60000,
p3 = 9000/60000, p4 = 15000/60000 and s13 = 26000/35000, s23 = 10000/19000,
and s43 = 15000/24000. The ASN for rejecting each hypothesis using BRAVO,
assuming α = 0.05, is 44.5, 6885, and 246 ballots respectively. We expect we will
need to sample 6885 ballots during the audit as a whole.
The underlying statistical principles of the BRAVO RLA are described by
Lindeman et al. (2012).
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4.2 MACRO ballot-level comparison RLAs for FPTP
Stark (2010) presents a method for conducting a ballot-level comparison RLA of
a collection of FPTP contests simultaneously. We refer to this audit as MACRO.
In this section, we describe MACRO in the context of a single race, where each
ballot records a vote for a single candidate. This audit randomly samples paper
ballots from the set B˜ and finds the matching electronic records in B. For each
such ballot, we compare the paper b˜ and recorded b representations. We assess the
difference in these representations in terms of the extent to which any error has
overstated a pairwise margin between a winner and loser. The procedure followed
by MACRO is shown in Figure 3.
For each sampled ballot, we compute its maximum across-contest relative over-
statement (MACRO). In the single-contest setting, this statistic could be denoted
the maximum relative overstatement. In an election with winners W , and losers
L, the MACRO for a ballot b is defined by Stark (2009b) as:
eb = max
w∈W,l∈L
(vbw − abw − vbl + abl)/Vwl (5)
where: vbc ∈ {0, 1} is 1 if b is a recorded vote for candidate c, and 0 otherwise;
abc ∈ {0, 1} is 1 if b˜ is an actual vote for candidate c; and Vij the pairwise margin
(difference in recorded tallies) between candidates i and j. For a given recorded
ballot b, Equation 5 computes the maximum extent to which any discrepancy
between b and b˜ has overestimated a pairwise margin between a winner w and loser
l pair. For example, consider the situation in which a paper ballot b˜ expresses a vote
for loser l (abl = 1). Its electronic record expresses a vote for winner w (vbw = 1,
vbl = 0 and abw = 0). This discrepancy has overestimated the pairwise margin
between w and l by 2 votes.
Recall that a BRAVO audit maintains a statistic Twl for each winner/loser pair.
These statistics are updated as ballots are sampled, and are used as a stopping
criterion for the audit. In a MACRO audit, a different statistic is maintained – a
running Kaplan-Markov MACRO P-value (PKM). As each ballot b is sampled, we
multiply PKM as shown below (Stark, 2010):
PKM = PKM ×
1− 1/U
1− eb2γ/Vmin
(6)
where: Vmin is the smallest recorded margin between a winning and losing can-
didate (the difference in their tallies); γ ≥ 1 an “error inflation factor” (an oper-
ational parameter for the audit, described below); U = (2γ|B|)/Vmin; and eb is
defined as per Equation 5. We continue to sample ballots until either a maximum
numberM of ballots have been checked (indicating that a full recount is required),
or PKM falls below the risk limit α of the audit.
When applied in practice, two parameters (γ ≥ 1 and λ < 1) influence the
size of the initial sample of ballots drawn in a MACRO audit, the expected ad-
ditional auditing effort required when certain types of discrepancies arise during
the audit (i.e., 2-vote overstatements), and present additional stopping conditions.
The “error tolerance” λ is relevant only when a batch of ballots is drawn as the
initial sample, as opposed to a single ballot, and consequently we set λ = 0 when
applying MACRO in our IRV audits. We experiment with varying values for γ
when simulating our IRV audits.
10 Michelle Blom1, Peter J. Stuckey2, Vanessa J. Teague1
macro(B, B˜, W , L, M , α, γ)
⊲ Compute the smallest pairwise margin between a winner and loser
1 Vmin := minw∈W,l∈L t(w)− t(l)
2 µ := Vmin|B|
3 U := 2γ/µ
⊲ Initialise running Kaplan-Markov MACRO P-value
4 PKM := 1
⊲ Initialise counter m recording number of ballots sampled thus far
5 m := 1
repeat
6 Randomly draw a ballot b˜ ∈ B˜ and matching reported ballot b ∈ B
7 For each candidate c, define vbc = 1 if b expresses a vote for
candidate c and abc = 1 if b˜ expresses a vote for c,
and vbc = abc = 0 otherwise
⊲ Compute the maximum relative overstatement caused by any
discrepancy between b and b˜
8 eb := maxw∈W,l∈L
vbw−abw−vbl+abl
t(w)−t(l)
9 PKM = PKM ×
1−1/U
1−
eb
2γ/Vmin
10 if (PKM ≤ α)
⊲ The reported outcome stands
11 return true
12 m := m+ 1
13 until(m ≥M)
⊲ A full recount is required
14 return false
Fig. 3: MACRO ballot-level comparison RLA of a FPTP election with actual
ballots B˜, reported ballots B, declared winnersW and losers L, inflation factor γ,
risk limit α and sampling limit M .
Given an overall risk limit α, we can estimate the number of ballots that must
be sampled by a MACRO audit under the assumption that no errors are present
in the electronic ballot records. We reuse the terminology of ballot polling audits,
and call this number of ballots the Average Sample Number (ASN) for the audit.
Given an election with reported ballots B, the ASN for a MACRO audit, with risk
limit α, is defined by Stark (2010) as:
ASN ≃ −ln(α)U (7)
where U is defined as above. Equation 7 is derived following Steps 4 and 6 on page
8 of Stark (2010) with λ = 0.
Example 3 Consider the first round of the IRV election of Example 1, viewed as a
FPTP election with winners c1, c2, and c4, and loser c3. This election can be au-
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dited by a single application of MACRO (Figure 3). The tallies for each candidate
are shown in Table 1, column two. The margins between each winner-loser pair in
this first round election are Vc1,c3 = 17000, Vc2,c3 = 1000, and Vc4,c3 = 6000. The
smallest winner-loser margin Vmin is 1000. Using the formula in Equation 7, with
α = 0.05 and γ = 1.1, the expected number of ballot checks required by MACRO
is 395.4, with U = (2γ|B|)/Vmin = 132.
When auditing this first-round election, the algorithm of Figure 3 randomly
draws a paper ballot b˜ ∈ B˜ and compares it to its electronic record b ∈ B. If b˜
and b match, the computed error eb is equal to 0. Consider the situation in which
a paper ballot with ranking b˜ = [c3, c4] has been recorded as a b = [c2, c3, c4]
ballot, with the election profile listed in Example 1 representing reported counts.
To determine the impact of this erroneous recorded ballot, we look at each winner
w and loser l pair (c1,c3), (c2, c3), and (c4, c3). For each winner-loser pair, we
compute, and take the maximum of, the expression:
vbw − abw − vbl + abl
f(w)− f(l)
(8)
For (c1, c3) and (c4, c3) the numerator in the above expression is equal to 1 –
the error in the reported ballot overestimated the margin between these winners
and the loser by 1 vote. For pair (c2, c3), the numerator in the above expression
is equal to 2 – the error in the reported ballot overestimated the margin between
c2 and c3 by 2 votes. For this ballot, eb = 2× 10
−3.
The underlying statistical principles of the MACRO audit are described by
Stark (2010).
5 Risk-Limiting Audits for IRV Elections
In this section we present four different approaches for conducting a ballot-polling
or ballot-level comparison RLA for an IRV election. The first method audits the
entire elimination order, ensuring that every step in the IRV election was correct
(with some confidence). The second method simplifies the auditing task in settings
where we can eliminate multiple candidates in a single round. The third method
seeks to examine only whether the eventual winner was the correct one. The fourth
approach is a general algorithm, RAIRE, for finding efficient ballot-polling and
ballot-level comparison RLAs for IRV elections.
Each of these involves auditing simultaneously a collection A of different ‘as-
sertions’ or hypotheses, whose conjunction is what we actually want to check. In
the first case, we are interested in checking the complete elimination order; in
later methods we are interested in a collection of assertions which, taken together,
imply that the announced winner truly won. Each of these assertions represents a
hypothesis that can be checked with a single application of a BRAVO or MACRO
audit – for example, that candidate c has a higher tally than c′ when candidates S
are still standing, and C \ S have been eliminated. Each of these individual audits
is conducted to the same risk limit α. If at any point, any of the audits fail to
reach a positive conclusion, we manually recount the whole election. It is easy to
see that this process constitutes a valid risk-limiting audit to risk limit α of the
election result, assuming that our collection of chosen assertions does indeed imply
12 Michelle Blom1, Peter J. Stuckey2, Vanessa J. Teague1
that that candidate won. Suppose that the announced election outcome is actually
wrong. Then at least one assertion in A must be false. The individual audit of that
assertion will therefore go to a full manual recount with a probability of at least
1− α, at which point we hand count the whole election.
In the following sections we outline how each of the four approaches for auditing
an IRV election, described above, can be conducted as ballot-polling or ballot-level
comparison RLAs.
5.1 Auditing a particular elimination order
The simplest approach to applying risk limiting auditing to IRV is to consider the
IRV election as a number of simultaneous FPTP elections, one for each IRV round.
This was suggested by Sarwate et al. (2013), but not explored algorithmically.Note
that this may perform much more auditing than required, since it verifies more
than whether the eventual winner was correct, but that every step in the IRV
election was correct (with some confidence).
Given an election B of n candidates C, we define the computed elimination
order as π = [c1, c2, . . . , cn−1, cn] where c1 is the first eliminated candidate, c2 the
second, etc, and cn the eventual winner.
We treat each IRV round as a FPTP election. In round i, we have a set of
winning candidates (Cw, the candidates that are still standing after round i) and a
single losing candidate (l = ci, the candidate eliminated in round i). More formally,
the set of candidates in the round i FPTP election is Cl = {cj | i ≤ j ≤ n}. Each
candidate c ∈ Cl has a recorded tally of tCl(c). The loser of this election is l = ci
and the set of n− i winners denoted by Cl \ {l}.
5.1.1 Auditing the elimination order by ballot-polling
We can audit all these FPTP elections simultaneously by considering all the
null hypotheses that would violate the announced result. These are {t˜Cl(c) ≤
t˜Cl(cl) | 1 ≤ i ≤ n − 1, l = ci, c ∈ Ci \ {l}} – i.e., that the eliminated candidate
in each round i does not have fewer votes than each of the other candidates that
are still standing in that round. We represent these hypotheses by a pair (w, l) of
winner w = c, and loser l = ci. The statistic maintained for this test is Twl. Each
loser loses in only one round so there is no ambiguity.
The overall audit proceeds as shown in Figure 4. The set of hypotheses H are
pairs (w, l) of winner w and loser l, and are interpreted as a hypothesis for the
FPTP election corresponding to the round where l was eliminated. The calculation
of the expected ratio of votes swl must be made using the tallies from this round,
and we must consider every ballot to see how it is interesting for that particular
hypothesis. As each ballot b is drawn, we interpret it as a vote for candidate c if
c = first(pCl(b)). In this case, candidate c is the first ranked candidate of those
still standing in this round. A ballot that is exhausted after k rounds, for example,
will not play a role when determining the statistics for later round hypotheses.
Example 4 Consider the IRV election of Example 1. The null hypotheses we need
to reject are f˜(c1) ≤ f˜(c3), f˜(c2) ≤ f˜(c3), and f˜(c4) ≤ f˜(c3) from the first round
election, t˜{c1,c2,c4}(c1) ≤ t˜{c1,c2,c4}(c2) and t˜{c1,c2,c4}(c3) ≤ t˜{c1,c2,c4}(c2) from
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irv-bravo(B˜, π, α, M)
1 H := ∅
⊲ Build a set of hypotheses to check by interpreting each round
as a k-winner FPTP election with a single loser l (the eliminated
candidate) and a set of winners Cl \ {l}
2 for(i ∈ 1..|π| − 1)
⊲ π(i) denotes the candidate in position i of elimination order π
3 l := π(i)
⊲ Cl denotes the set of candidates still standing in round i
4 Cl := {π(i), π(i+ 1), . . . , π(|π|)}
⊲ Candidates in positions i+ 1 to |π| are viewed as the winners of a
FPTP election with one loser, candidate l. For each winner w/loser l
pair we want to confirm the hypothesis that w does in fact beat l in
this election. We do so by rejecting or disproving the null hypothesis
that tCl(w) ≤ tCl(l)
5 for(j ∈ i+ 1..|π|)
6 w := π(j)
7 Twl := 1
8 swl := tCl(w)/(tCl(w) + tCl(l))
9 H := H ∪ {(w, l)}
⊲ Initialise counter m recording number of ballots sampled thus far
10 m := 0
⊲ We randomly draw a ballot, updating our statistics Twl with each
ballot drawn, until a maximum number of ballots M have been drawn,
or we have rejected all |H| hypotheses
11 while(m < M ∧H 6= ∅)
12 randomly draw ballot b from B˜
13 m := m+ 1
14 for((w, l) ∈ H)
⊲ if b expresses a vote for w, we increase Twl
15 if (w = first(pCl(b)))
16 Twl := Twl × 2swl
17 if (Twl ≥ 1/α)
⊲ We reject the null hypothesis that tCl(w) ≤ tCl(l)
18 H = H − {(w, l)}
⊲ if b expresses a vote for l, we decrease Twl
19 else if (l = first(pCl(b)))
20 Twl := Twl × 2(1− swl)
21 if (H = ∅)
⊲ The reported outcome stands
22 return true
23 else
⊲ A full recount is required
24 return false
Fig. 4: A risk-limiting ballot-polling RLA of an IRV election with actual ballots
B˜, order of elimination π, risk limit α and limit on ballots checked M .
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the second and t˜{c1,c4}(c4) ≤ t˜{c1,c4}(c1) from the final round. Assuming α = 0.05
the ASNs for the first round are the same as calculated in Example 2. The ASNs
required to disprove the two stated null hypotheses for the second round election
are 51.8 and 64.0. The ASN required to disprove the final round null hypothesis
is 1186. The ASN of the overall audit is the maximum of the ASNs required to
disprove all null hypotheses, across each round. For this election, this ASN is 6885.
The weakness of this naive approach is that inconsequential earlier elimination
rounds can be difficult to audit even if they are irrelevant to the winner.
Example 5 Consider an election with candidates c1, c2, c3, c4, c5 and ballots [c1] :
10000, [c2] : 6000, [c3, c2] : 3000, [c3, c1] : 2000, [c4] : 500, [c5] : 499. The elimination
order is [c5, c4, c3, c2, c1]. Given α = 0.05, rejecting the null hypothesis that c5 beat
c4 in the first round gives an ASN of 13,165,239 indicating a full recount is required.
But it is irrelevant to the election result.
5.1.2 Auditing the elimination order by a comparison audit
Each of these FPTP elections can also be audited via a single application of
MACRO (Figure 3) with W = Cl \ {l}, L = {l}, and appropriate instantiations
of the risk limit α and inflator γ parameters. As in the ballot-polling context, we
can audit each of these FPTP elections simultaneously. In contrast to the ballot-
polling audit, we need only perform a single comparison RLA (using MACRO) for
each IRV round. Our ballot-polling audit applies BRAVO to each of a series of
hypotheses in each round (one for each winner-loser pair).
Example 6 Consider again the IRV election shown in Example 1. To audit the
entire elimination order with a comparison audit, we treat each IRV round as
a FPTP election and run a MACRO audit. Assuming α = 0.05, and γ = 1.1,
the expected number of ballot checks required by MACRO is the same as that
calculated in Example 3. For the remaining two IRV rounds, the ASNs required
by MACRO are 28.2 and 98.9. The ASN of the overall audit is the maximum of
the ASNs required by MACRO in each round. For this election, this ASN is 395.4.
In this case, auditing the entire elimination order by a comparison audit is likely
to be more efficient than a corresponding ballot-polling audit.
5.2 Simultaneous elimination
It is common in IRV elections to eliminate multiple candidates in a single round if
it can be shown that the order of elimination cannot affect later rounds. Given an
elimination order π we can simultaneously eliminate candidates E = {π(i)..π(i+
k)} if the sum of tallies of these candidates is less than the tally of the next candi-
date to be eliminated, π(i+k+1). Let C = {π(i), π(i+1), . . . π(k), π(k+1), . . . π(n)}
be the set of candidates standing after the first i − 1 have been eliminated. We
can simultaneously eliminate E if:
tC(c) >
∑
c′∈E
tC(c
′) ∀c ∈ C \E (9)
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This is because no matter which order the candidates in E are eliminated no
candidate could ever garner a tally greater than one of the candidates in C \ E.
Hence they will all be eliminated in any case. As the remainder of the election only
depends on the set of eliminated candidates and not their order, the simultaneous
elimination can have no effect on later rounds of the election.
We can take advantage of simultaneous elimination when auditing by con-
sidering all the simultaneously eliminated candidates E as a single loser l. Like
the audit of a particular elimination sequence, we are proving a stronger result
than necessary, i.e. that a particular sequence of (possibly multiple) eliminations
is valid. Utilising simultaneous elimination, however, often results in a much lower
ASN, though not necessarily: sometimes the combined total of first preferences in
E is very close to the next tally, so a lot of auditing is required. It may be better
to audit each elimination individually in this case. It is possible to compute the
ASN for each approach and choose the method that requires the least auditing,
assuming the outcome is correct.
5.2.1 Simultaneous elimination by ballot-polling
We want to reject hypotheses t˜C(w) ≤ t˜C(l) for each w ∈ C \E. The statistic Twl
in this case is increased when we draw a ballot where w is the highest-ranked of
remaining candidates C, and decreased when we draw a ballot where c′ ∈ E is the
highest-ranked of remaining candidates C.
The elimination of all these null hypotheses is sufficient to prove that the
multiple elimination is correct. This can then be combined with the audit of the
rest of the elimination sequence, as described in Section 5.1, to test whether the
election’s announced winner is correct.
Example 7 Consider the election in Example 5. We can simultaneously eliminate
the candidates E = {c5, c4} since the sum of their tallies 499 + 500 < 5000 which
is the lowest tally of the other candidates (c1, c2, and c3). If we do this the difficult
first round elimination auditing disappears. This shows the benefit of simultaneous
elimination. The ASNs required for the joint elimination of E are 17.0, 36.2 and
49.1 ballots, as opposed to requiring a full recount.
After this simultaneous elimination, the tallies for the three candidate elec-
tion {c1, c2, c3} are c1 : 10000, c2 : 6000 and c3 : 5000. The ASNs to reject the
hypotheses t˜C(c1) ≤ t˜C(c3) and t˜C(c2) ≤ t˜C(c3) are 77.6 and 1402 respectively.
We could also simultaneously eliminate {c5, c4, c3} since the sum of their tallies
499+500+5000< 6000 which is the lowest tally of the other candidate (that of c2).
But this will lead to a very difficult hypothesis to reject, t˜C(c2) ≤ t˜C({c5, c4, c3})
since the tallies are almost identical! The ASN is 158,156,493! This illustrates that
simultaneous elimination may not always be beneficial.
5.2.2 Simultaneous elimination by a ballot-level comparison RLA
As in the ballot-polling context, we treat any simultaneously eliminated candidates
E as a single loser l, eliminated in a single round i. We treat each round as a FPTP
election, audited via a single application of MACRO.
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Example 8 Consider again the election in Example 5, in the setting where we
simultaneously eliminate candidates E = {c5, c4} in the first round. When viewed
as a single losing candidate l, the winner-loser pairwise margins in this first round
FPTP election are Vc1,l = 9001, Vc2,l = 5001, and Vc3,l = 4001. Assuming α =
0.05 and γ = 1.1, the expected number of ballot checks required by MACRO to
audit this first round FPTP election is 36.2. In the second round FPTP election,
candidates c1, c2 and c3 remain with winners {c1, c2} and loser c3. The winner-
loser pairwise margins in this election are Vc1,c3 = 5000 and Vc2,c3 = 1000, with
Vmin = 1000. The expected number of ballot checks required by MACRO to audit
this election is 145. In the final round election, our winner is c1 and loser c2,
with Vc1,c2 = 3000. The expected number of ballot checks required by MACRO
to audit this election is 48.3. The overall ASN for the comparison audit, given
simultaneous elimination of candidates c4 and c5, is 145. This is less than that of
the ballot-polling variant at 1402.
5.3 Winner only auditing
The above two methods consider auditing the entire IRV process to ensure that we
are confident on all its outcomes – i.e., that the correct candidate was eliminated
in each round. This is too strong since even if earlier eliminations happened in a
different order it may not have any effect on the eventual winner.
Example 9 Consider an election with ballots [c1, c2, c3] : 10000, [c2, c1, c3] : 6000
and [c3, c1, c2] : 5999. No simultaneous elimination is possible, and auditing that
c3 is eliminated before c2 will certainly require a full recount. But even if c2 were
eliminated first it would not change the winner of the election.
5.3.1 Winner only auditing via ballot-polling
An alternate approach for auditing IRV elections is to simply reject the n− 1 null
hypotheses {f˜(w) ≤ t˜{w,l}(l)} where w is the declared winner of the IRV election,
and l ∈ C\{w} refers to each of the non-winning candidates. This hypothesis states
that loser l gets more votes than winner w where l is given the maximal possible
votes it could ever achieve before w is eliminated, and w gets only its first round
primary vote (the minimal possible votes it could ever hold). When we reject this
hypothesis we are confident that there could not be any elimination order where
w is eliminated before l. If all these hypotheses are rejected then we are assured
that w is the winner of the election, independent of the order in which all other
candidates are eliminated.
Example 10 Consider the election of Example 9. We must reject the hypotheses
that {f˜(c1) ≤ t˜{c1,c2}(c2)} (c1 is eliminated before c2) and {f˜(c1) ≤ t˜{c1,c2}(c3)}
(c1 is eliminated before c3). The primary vote for c1 is 10000, while the maximum
tally that c2 can achieve before c1 is eliminated is 6000. The maximum tally that c3
can achieve before c1 is eliminated is 5999. Auditing to reject these hypotheses is
not difficult. The ASNs are 98.4 and 98.3 ballots. Note that if the [c2, c1, c3] ballots
were changed to [c2, c3, c1], the maximum tally that c3 can achieve is 12000, and
the hypothesis that (c1 is eliminated before c3) could not be rejected. In this case
just changing a single vote could result in c3 winning the election, so this election
will need a full recount.
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5.3.2 Winner only auditing via a ballot-level comparison RLA
The ballot-level comparison RLA version of the winner-only audit proceeds in
a similar fashion to its ballot-polling counterpart. Given a election with winner
w and losers C \ {w}, the ballot-polling audit executes a BRAVO audit for each
winner-loser (w, l) pair, where l ∈ C \ {w}. In each of these audits, w is awarded
only their primary vote f˜(w), while l is awarded all votes in which they appear
before w, or where they appear and w does not t˜{w,l}(l). This audit is designed
to disprove the null hypothesis that f˜(w) ≤ t˜{w,l}(l).
We apply the MACRO algorithm of Figure 3, in place of BRAVO, for each
winner-loser pair (w, l), with W = {w} and L = {l}.
Example 11 Consider the election of Example 9. For winner-loser pair (c1, c3), we
apply MACRO to an election with winner c1, and loser c3, where c1 has a tally
of 10000 and c3 a tally of 5999. Even though c1 appears before c3 in the [c2, c1,
c3] ballots, we only award c1 with its first preference votes in a winner-only audit.
If the positions of c1 and c3 were swapped in these ballots, these ballots would
be treated as votes for c3. In this election, Vmin = 4001 and we expect to check
36.2 ballots. For winner-loser pair (c1, c2), we apply MACRO to an election with
winner c1, and loser c2, where c1 has a tally of 10000 votes and c2 a tally of 6000.
The ASN for this election is also 36.2 ballots.
6 Finding efficient ballot-polling or comparison RLAs for IRV
In each of the ballot-polling and ballot-level comparison RLAs for IRV described
above, we apply an existing risk limiting audit (BRAVO, as per Figure 4, or
MACRO, as per Figure 3) to confirm a collection of assertions with a given level
of statistical confidence. In the case of a winner-only audit, for example, we are
seeking to confirm that the reported winner w could not have been eliminated
before any one of the reported losers l ∈ C\{w}. This results in |C \{w}| assertions
to be confirmed, one for each winner-loser pair.
For each assertion that we seek to confirm, we can estimate the number of bal-
lots that must be checked via an application of BRAVO or MACRO, assuming no
errors are found. We present a general algorithm for choosing the set of assertions
A that can be checked most efficiently to confirm that the reported winner cw was
correct. The algorithm, denoted RAIRE, achieves this by finding the easiest way
to show that all election outcomes in which a candidate other than cw won, did
not arise, with a given level of statistical confidence, for a given method of auditing
each assertion. The algorithm can be applied to generate either a ballot-polling or
a ballot-level comparison RLA for an IRV election.
Note that our risk-limit follows directly from BRAVO and MACRO: if the
election outcome is wrong, then one of the assertions inAmust be false—a BRAVO
or MACRO audit with risk limit α will detect this with probability at least 1−α,
and we then manually recount the whole election.
RAIRE, outlined in Figure 5, explores the tree of alternate elimination se-
quences, ending in a candidate c′ 6= cw. Each node is a partial (or complete)
elimination sequence. For each node π, we consider the set of assertions that (i)
can be proven with an application of BRAVO or MACRO and (ii) any one of which
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disproves the outcome that π represents. We label each node π with the assertion
a from this set that requires the least number of anticipated ballot samples (ASN)
to prove, denoted ASN(a). We use the notation a(π) and ASN(a(π)) to represent
the assertion assigned to π and the ASN for this assertion, respectively. RAIRE
finds a set of assertions to prove, denoted A, that: validates the correctness of a
given election outcome, with risk limit α; and for which the largest ASN of these
assertions is minimised. When performing a ballot-polling audit, we compute this
ASN via Equation 4, and Equation 7 when generating a comparison RLA.
Consider a partial elimination sequence π = [c, . . . , w] of at least two candi-
dates, leading to an alternate winner w. This sequence represents the suffix of a
complete order – an outcome in which the candidates in C \π have been previously
eliminated, in some order. We define a function FindBestAudit(π, C, B, α[, γ]) that
finds the easiest to prove assertion a, with the smallest ASN, which disproves the
outcome π given risk limit α. The parameter γ is only used when generating a
ballot-level comparison RLA.
For the outcome π = [c| . . .], FindBestAudit considers the following assertions:
WO(c,c′): Assertion that c beats c′ ∈ π, where c′ 6= c appears later in π, in a
winner only audit of the form described in Section 5.3, with winner c and loser
c′. This invalidates the sequence as c cannot be eliminated before c′;
WO(c′′,c): Assertion that c′′ ∈ C \π beats c in a winner-only audit with winner c′′
and loser c. Candidate c′′ does not appear in π, and consequently is assumed
eliminated in some prior round. Proving this assertion invalidates the sequence
as it shows that c′′ cannot be eliminated before c;
IRV(c,c′,{c′′ | c′′ ∈ π}): Assertion that c beats some c′ 6= c ∈ π in a BRAVO (or
MACRO) audit with winner c and loser c′, under the assumption that the only
candidates remaining are those in π (i.e. the set {c′′ | c′′ ∈ π}). All other candi-
dates have eliminated with their votes distributed to later preferences. Proving
this assertion invalidates the sequence as shows that c cannot be eliminated at
this stage in an IRV election.
We assume that if no assertion exists with an ASN less than |B| the function
returns a dummy INF assertion with ASN(INF) = +∞.
For an election with candidates C and winner cw, RAIRE starts by adding
|C| − 1 partial elimination orders to an initially empty priority queue F , one for
each alternate winner c 6= cw (Steps 4 to 9). The set A is initially empty. For
orders π containing a single candidate c, FindBestAudit considers the assertions
WO(c′′,c), which means that candidate c′′ 6= c beats c in a winner-only audit of
the form described in Section 5.3, with winner c′′ and loser c, for each c′′ ∈ C\{c}.
The assertion a with the smallest ASN(a) is recorded in asr[π] (Step 7). For each
partial sequence π added to F , we are finding the easiest to prove assertion a that
invalidates the outcome.
For each partial elimination order π in F , we also keep record of a ‘best ances-
tor’ ba[π] (Steps 8 and 21). The best ancestor is the subsequence of π that can be
invalidated with the least auditing effort. For example, consider a partial elimina-
tion order π = [c1, c3, c2]. This corresponds to an election in which c1, c3, and c2
are the last three remaining candidates, after all others have been eliminated, with
c2 winning the election. The ancestors of π are the sequences [c1, c3, c2], [c3, c2]
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RAIRE(C, B, cw, α[, γ])
1 A ← ∅
2 F ← ∅ ⊲ F is a set sequences to expand (the frontier)
3 LB ← 0
⊲ Populate F with single-candidate sequences
4 for each(c ∈ C \ {cw}):
5 π ← [c]
6 a ← FindBestAudit(π, C, B, α[, γ])
7 asr[π]← a ⊲ Record best assertion for π
8 ba[π]← π ⊲ Record best ancestor sequence for π
9 F ← F ∪ {π}
⊲ Repeatedly expand the sequence with largest ASN in F
10 while(|F | > 0):
11 π ← argmax{ASN(asr[π]) | π ∈ F}
12 F ← F \ {π}
13 if (ASN(asr[ba[π]])≤ LB):
14 A ← A∪ {asr[ba[π]]}
15 F ← F \ {π′ ∈ F | ba[π] is a suffix of π′}
16 continue
17 for each(c ∈ C \ π):
18 π′ ← [c] ++π
19 a ← FindBestAudit(π′, C, B, α[, γ])
20 asr[π′]← a
21 ba[π′] ← if ASN(a) < ASN(asr[ba[π]]) then π′ else ba[π]
22 if (|π′| = |C|):
23 if (ASN(asr[ba[π′]]) =∞):
24 terminate algorithm, full recount necessary
25 else:
26 A ← A∪ {asr[ba[π′]]}
27 LB ← max(LB, ASN(asr[ba[π′]]))
28 F ← F \ {π′ ∈ F | ba[π] is a suffix of π′}
29 continue
30 else:
31 F ← F ∪ {π′}
32 return A with maximum ASN equal to LB
Fig. 5: The RAIRE algorithm for finding a least cost collection of assertion s to
audit, with parallel applications of BRAVO or MACRO, defining a risk-limiting
audit of an IRV election with candidates C, ballots B, and winner cw, with a given
risk limit α, and inflator parameter γ (if using MACRO).
and [c2]. Note that we include the sequence itself in this set. The best ancestor is
the (sub)sequence π′ with the smallest asr[π′]. This tells us that proving assertion
asr[π′] is currently the best known way to disprove all elimination orders that end
in π. The purpose of keeping track of these ‘best ancestors’ will become apparent
in the following paragraphs.
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The algorithm works by exploring a tree of possible alternate elimination or-
ders. For each elimination order that it visits, it finds the least cost assertion that,
if proven, invalidates the outcome. As the algorithm progresses, we maintain a
lower bound (initialised to 0 in Step 3) on the total auditing effort required in
the most efficient audit for the given election. This corresponds to the ASN of the
hardest to prove assertion sitting in A.
We repeatedly find and remove a partial sequence π in F for expansion (Steps
11 and 12). This is the sequence with the (equal) highest ASN – i.e., the sequence
π with the highest associated asr[π]. When expanding a sequence π, we first check
whether its current best ancestor has an ASN lower than the current lower bound
LB (Steps 13 to 16). If so, we simply add the corresponding assertion (asr[ba[π]])
to A and remove any sequences in F which are subsumed by this ancestor (have it
as a suffix). We know that the best audit we can find has an ASN of at least LB.
Adding asr[ba[π]] to our audit will disprove all outcomes ending in ba[π] while not
increasing its ASN.
Otherwise, we create a new elimination sequence π′ with c appended to the
start of π ([c] ++π) for each c ∈ C \ π (Steps 17 to 31). For a new sequence π′,
FindBestAudit finds the assertion a requiring the least auditing effort to prove in
order to invalidate π′. We record (Step 20) this as the assertion for asr[π′] = h. We
calculate (Step 21) the best ancestor of π′ by comparing the ASN for its assertion
with that of its best ancestor. If the sequence π′ is complete, then we known one of
its ancestors (including itself) must be audited. If the best of these is infinite, we
terminate, a full recount is necessary. Otherwise we add the assertion of its best
ancestor to A and remove all sequences in F which are subsumed by this ancestor.
We update LB to the ASN of the hardest to prove assertion already part of our
audit (Step 27). If the sequence is not complete, we add it to our frontier F .
Example 12 Consider an election with ballots [c1, c2, c3] : 5000, [c1, c3, c2] : 5000
[c2, c3, c1] : 5000, [c2, c1, c3] : 1500, [c3, c2, c1] : 5000, [c3, c1, c2] : 500, and [c4, c1] :
5000, and candidates c1 to c4. The initial tallies are: c1: 10000; c2: 6500; c3: 5500;
c4: 5000. Candidates c4, c3, and c2 are eliminated, in that order, with winner c1.
In a ballot-polling or comparison winner-only audit (α = 0.05), we cannot
show that c1 beats c3, or that c1 beats c2, as c1’s first preference tally (of 10000
votes) is less than the total number of ballots that we could attribute to c2 and
c3 (11500 and 10500, respectively). Simultaneous elimination is not applicable, as
no sequences of candidates can be eliminated in a group. In an audit of the whole
elimination order (as per Section 5.1), the loss of c4 to c1, c2, and c3 is the most
challenging to audit. The ASN for the ballot-polling version of this audit, assuming
α = 0.05, is 25% of all ballots (6750 ballots). The ballot-level comparison version
of this audit, assuming γ = 1.1, is 1.3% of all ballots (351 ballots).
RAIRE finds a set of assertions that can be proven using a ballot-polling audit
with a maximum ASN of 1% (or 270 ballots, with α = 0.05), and that consequently
rule out all elimination sequences that end in a candidate other than c1. This audit
tests the assertions: c1 beats c2 if c3 and c4 have been eliminated (ASN of 1%); c1
beats c3 if c2 and c4 have been eliminated (ASN 0.5%); c1 beats c4 in a winner-only
audit (ASN 0.4%); and that c1 beats c3 if c4 has been eliminated (ASN 0.1%).
If we instead use RAIRE to build a comparison audit, we find an audit with a
maximum ASN of 0.17%. The assertions in this audit are: c1 beats c2 if c3 and c4
have been eliminated (ASN of 0.17%); c1 beats c3 if c4 has been eliminated (ASN
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of 0.07%); c1 beats c3 if both c2 and c4 has been eliminated (ASN of 0.11%); c1
beats c4 in a winner-only audit (ASN of 0.13%); and c2 and c3 beat c4 with all
remaining candidates eliminated (ASN of 0.04%).
7 Computational Results
We have simulated the ballot-polling and ballot-level comparison RLAs described
in Section 5 on 21 US IRV elections held between 2007 and 2014, and on the IRV
elections held across 93 electorates in the 2015 state election in New South Wales
(NSW), Australia. For each election, we have simulated each audit with varying
risk limits (α = 1% and α = 5%), and γ = 1.1.2 We record, for each simulated
audit, the number of ballots that were sampled during the audit (expressed as a
percentage of ballots cast). An audit that needs to sample fewer ballots before con-
firming the correctness of the reported outcome, to the given degree of statistical
confidence, is a more efficient audit. As each audit involves ballots being drawn
at random, we simulate each audit 10 times and compute the average number of
ballots checked across those 10 simulations.
All experiments have been conducted on a machine with an Intel Xeon Plat-
inum 8176 chip (2.1GHz), and 1TB of RAM. The aim of these experiments is to
demonstrate that RLAs for IRV elections are feasible – only a small fraction of
ballots need be sampled in elections that are not extremely close – and compare
the efficiency of different types of IRV RLA.
Table 2 compares the number of ballot checks required by ballot-polling and
comparison audits of the form described in Section 5.1 (auditing the entire elimina-
tion order) across our suite of election instances. The number of required samples
is reported alongside the ASN for each audit (computed as per Equation 4 for each
ballot-polling audit, and Equation 7 for each comparison audit), and the margin
of victory (MOV) for each election (computed using the algorithm of Blom et al.
(2016)). Tables 3 and 4 similarly compare the number of ballot samples required
by simultaneous elimination and winner-only ballot-polling and comparison audits,
described in Sections 5.2 and 5.3. In this experiment, no errors or discrepancies
have been injected into the set of reported ballots in each election instance (B ≡ B˜).
Tables 2 to 4 show that performing a winner-only audit can be much easier
than auditing the full elimination order (with or without the use of simultaneous
elimination), irrespective of whether we are conducting a ballot-polling or com-
parison audit. This is the case for the 2013 Minneapolis Mayor and 2014 Oakland
Mayor elections. In some cases, winner-only audits are more challenging (or not
possible) as we seek to show that a candidate c (on just their first preference votes)
could have beaten another c′ (who is given all votes in which they appear before c
or in which they appear, but c does not). Even if c does beat c′ in the true outcome
of the election, this audit may not be able to prove this (see Pierce 2008 County
Executive, Oakland 2012 D5 City Council, and Aspen 2009 Mayor for examples).
Auditing with simultaneous elimination (grouping several eliminated candi-
dates into a single ‘super’ candidate) can be more efficient than auditing each
individual elimination. This is evident in the context of both ballot-polling audits
(see Berkeley 2010 D8 City Council, Berkeley 2012 Mayor, Oakland 2010 Mayor,
2 We explore the influence of the γ parameter in subsequent experiments.
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Auditing the Entire Elimination Order via a Ballot Polling (BP) and Comparison (CP) Audit
α = 1% α = 5%
BP CP (γ = 1.1) BP CP (γ = 1.1)
Election |C| |B| MOV Polls % ASN % Polls % ASN % Polls % ASN % Polls % ASN %
1 Berkeley 2010 D7 CC 4 4,682 364 (7%) 6.7 7.2 1.6 1.7 3.9 4.7 1.1 1.1
2 Berkeley 2010 D8 CC 4 5,333 878 (16%) ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ 94.1 94.2
3 Oakland 2010 D6 CC 4 14,040 2,603 (19%) 4.0 4.4 1 1 3 2.9 0.7 0.7
4 Pierce 2008 CC 4 43,661 2,007 (5%) 3.1 2.2 0.2 0.3 1.8 1.4 0.2 0.2
5 Pierce 2008 CAD 4 159,987 8,396 (5%) 0.3 0.5 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.1
6 Aspen 2009 Mayor 5 2,544 89 (4%) 62.4 71.8 9 9 52.7 46.9 5.9 5.9
7 Berkeley 2010 D1 CC 5 6,426 1,174 (18%) 2.4 1.7 5.8 5.9 1.6 1.1 3.8 3.8
8 Berkeley 2010 D4 CC 5 5,708 517 (9%) 7.5 7 6.3 6.3 6 4.7 4.1 4.1
9 Oakland 2012 D5 CC 5 13,482 486 (4%) 11.2 10.3 1.5 1.5 7.3 6.7 1 1
10 Pierce 2008 CE 5 312,771 2,027 (1%) 11.6 15.1 0.2 0.2 7.6 9.8 0.2 0.2
11 San Leandro 2012 D4 CC 5 28,703 2,332 (8%) 9.3 9.7 0.9 1 6.3 6.3 0.6 0.6
12 Oakland 2012 D3 CC 7 26,761 386 (1%) ∞ ∞ 22.5 22.5 ∞ ∞ 14.6 14.7
13 Pierce 2008 CAS 7 312,771 1,111 (0.4%) ∞ ∞ 3.7 3.7 ∞ ∞ 2.4 2.4
14 San Leandro 2010 Mayor 7 23,494 116 (0.5%) ∞ ∞ 18.4 18.4 92.9 ∞ 12 12
15 Berkeley 2012 Mayor 8 57,492 8,522 (15%) 94.6 ∞ 5.9 5.9 77 ∞ 3.8 3.8
16 Oakland 2010 D4 CC 8 23,884 2,329 (10%) ∞ ∞ 7.7 7.7 76.4 ∞ 5.4 5.4
17 Aspen 2009 CC 11 2,544 35 (1%) ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞
18 Oakland 2010 Mayor 11 122,268 1,013 (1%) ∞ ∞ 12.2 12.2 ∞ ∞ 7.9 7.9
19 Oakland 2014 Mayor 11 101,431 10,201 (10%) ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞
20 San Francisco 2007 Mayor 18 149,465 50,837 (34%) ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞
21 Minneapolis 2013 Mayor 36 79,415 6,949 (9%) ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞
22 Balmain NSW 2015 7 46,952 1,731 (3.7%) ∞ ∞ 34.9 34.9 ∞ ∞ 22.7 22.7
23 Campbelltown NSW 2015 5 45,124 3,096 (6.9%) 13.6 12.2 2.2 2.2 8.4 8 1.4 1.4
24 Gosford NSW 2015 6 48,259 102 (0.2%) ∞ ∞ 6.6 6.6 ∞ ∞ 4.3 4.3
25 Lake Macquarie NSW 2015 7 47,698 4,253 (8.9%) 27.7 22.8 3.5 3.5 14.5 15 2.3 2.3
26 Sydney NSW 2015 8 42,747 2,864 (6.7%) ∞ ∞ 59.6 59.6 ∞ ∞ 38.8 38.8
Table 2: Average # of ballots sampled (as a percentage of ballots cast) over 10 simulated ballot-polling (BP) and ballot-level
comparison audits (CP) of 26 IRV elections using the EO (auditing the entire elimination order) method. Parameter α ranges
between 1% and 5%, and γ = 1.1. Also reported is each election’s margin of victory (MOV). The notation∞ indicates a percentage
of ballots (or ASN) greater than 100%. CC, CE, CAD, and CAS denote City Council, County Executive, County Auditor, and County
Assessor. The most efficient audit (for α =1% and 5%) is highlighted in bold.
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Auditing with Simultaneous Elimination via a BP/CP Audit
α = 1% α = 5%
# |B| BP (%) CP (γ = 1.1, %) BP (%) CP (γ = 1.1, %)
Polls ASN Polls ASN Polls ASN Polls ASN
1 4,682 7.5 7.2 1.3 1.4 4 4.7 0.9 0.9
2 5,333 2.9 4.2 1 1 2 2.8 0.6 0.7
3 14,040 0.7 0.9 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.6 0.2 0.2
4 43,661 3.1 2.2 0.3 0.3 1.8 1.4 0.2 0.2
5 159,987 0.3 0.5 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.04 0.04
6 2,544 62.4 71.8 5.7 5.7 54.8 46.9 3.7 3.7
7 6,426 2.4 1.7 0.5 0.6 1.6 1.1 0.4 0.4
8 5,708 28.7 40.7 3 3.1 17.8 26.6 2 2
9 13,482 15.1 10.3 1.1 1.1 11.8 6.7 0.7 0.7
10 312,771 11.6 15.1 0.2 0.2 7.6 9.8 0.2 0.2
11 28,703 9.3 9.7 0.9 1 6.3 6.3 0.6 0.6
12 26,761 ∞ ∞ 22.5 22.5 ∞ ∞ 14.7 14.7
13 312,771 ∞ ∞ 3.7 3.7 ∞ ∞ 2.4 2.4
14 23,494 ∞ ∞ 4.4 4.4 92.9 ∞ 2.8 2.8
15 57,492 2.3 2.6 0.2 0.2 1.6 1.7 0.2 0.2
16 23,884 ∞ ∞ 7.7 7.7 ∞ ∞ 5 5
17 2,544 ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ 82.4 82.4
18 122,268 21.5 23.8 0.6 0.6 15 15.5 0.4 0.4
19 101,431 ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞
20 149,465 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01
21 79.415 ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞
22 46,952 83.8 ∞ 2.2 2.2 65.4 82 1.4 1.4
23 45,124 ∞ ∞ 3.7 3.7 ∞ ∞ 2.4 2.4
24 48,259 ∞ ∞ 5 5 ∞ ∞ 3.2 3.2
25 47,698 6.9 7.8 0.6 0.6 3.2 5.1 0.4 0.4
26 42,747 3.3 4.6 0.4 0.4 2.2 3 0.3 0.3
Table 3: Average # of ballots sampled (as a percentage of ballots cast) over 10
simulated ballot-polling (BP) and comparison audits (CP) of 26 IRV elections
with simultaneous elimination (SE), α ∈ {1%, 5%}, and γ = 1.1. A ∞ indicates
a percentage of ballots (or ASN) greater than 100%. The name, candidates, and
MOV of each election are shown in Table 2. The most efficient audit (for α =1%
and 5%) is highlighted in bold.
San Francisco 2007 Mayor, and Sydney NSW) and comparison audits (see Balmain
NSW 2015, Sydney NSW 2015, Oakland 2010 Mayor, San Leandro 2010 Mayor,
and Berkeley 2010 D8 City Council). Across the 26 elections in Tables 2 and 3,
conducting a comparison audit with simultaneous elimination was beneficial in
15 instances and detrimental in 2. In the context of ballot-polling audits, simul-
taneous elimination was beneficial in 8 and detrimental in 5. In some instances,
the tally of the super candidate is quite close to that of the next eliminated can-
didate, resulting in a more challenging audit. This is particularly evident in the
ballot-polling audits of Campbelltown NSW and Berkeley 2010 D4 City Council.
Tables 2 to 4 show that IRV comparison audits are generally more efficient than
their ballot-polling counterparts, as they are for FPTP elections. The Oakland
2012 D3 City Council election is an excellent example. Neither auditing the entire
elimination sequence, the sequence with simultaneous elimination, or conducting a
winner-only audit, is successful in the ballot-polling context. The ASN is more than
the total number of ballots in each case, indicating that a full recount is required.
We can conduct a comparison audit, using each of these methods, however, that
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Winner-Only Auditing via a BP/CP Audit
α = 1% α = 5%
# |B| BP (%) CP (γ = 1.1, %) BP (%) CP (γ = 1.1, %)
Polls ASN Polls ASN Polls ASN Polls ASN
1 4,682 8.7 22.4 2.5 2.6 4.9 14.7 1.7 1.7
2 5,333 1.3 1.8 0.7 0.7 0.8 1.2 0.4 0.5
3 14,040 0.4 0.5 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.1 0.1
4 43,661 3.2 4.1 0.3 0.3 1.8 2.7 0.2 0.2
5 159,987 0.5 1.2 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.8 0.1 0.1
6 2,544 ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞
7 6,426 1.1 1.1 0.4 0.5 0.8 0.7 0.3 0.3
8 5,708 4.9 7.3 1.3 1.4 3.8 4.8 0.9 0.9
9 13,482 ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞
10 312,771 ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞
11 28,703 1.1 4.4 0.5 0.5 0.8 2.9 0.3 0.3
12 26,761 ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞
13 312,771 ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞
14 23,494 ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞
15 57,492 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1
16 23,884 0.9 3.1 0.5 0.5 0.6 2 0.3 0.3
17 2,544 ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞
18 122,268 ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞
19 101,431 0.8 19.8 0.6 0.6 0.5 12.9 0.4 0.4
20 149,465 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
21 79,415 0.5 3.1 0.3 0.3 0.3 2.1 0.2 0.2
22 46,952 5.2 31.6 1 1 3.7 20.6 0.7 0.7
23 45,124 1.3 1.7 0.2 0.2 0.9 1.1 0.1 0.1
24 48,259 ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞
25 47,698 0.7 1.6 0.2 0.2 0.5 1 0.1 0.1
26 42,747 1.6 6.9 0.5 0.5 1 4.5 0.3 0.3
Table 4: Average # of ballots sampled (as a percentage of ballots cast) over 10
simulated ballot-polling (BP) and ballot-level comparison audits (CP) of 26 IRV
elections using the winner-only (WO) method, α ∈ {1%, 5%}, and γ = 1.1. A ∞
indicates a percentage of ballots (or ASN) greater than 100%. The name, candi-
dates, and MOV of each election are shown in Table 2. The most efficient audit
(for α =1% and 5%) is highlighted in bold.
requires only a fraction of cast ballots to be sampled (23% or 6155 ballots, 23%,
and 0.1% or 268 ballots, when auditing the entire elimination order, auditing with
simultaneous elimination, and conducting a winner-only audit, respectively). For
each simulated audit, increasing the risk limit reduced the average number of
required ballot samples, as expected.
Table 5 reports the average number of ballots examined by the ballot-polling
and ballot-level comparison audits generated by RAIRE across the 26 considered
elections (with α = 5%). We compare this level of auditing effort against the
number of ballot checks required by the best alternate auditing method (auditing
the entire elimination order [EO], simultaneous elimination [SE], and winner-only
auditing [WO]). Recall that RAIRE finds an appropriate set of assertions to audit
(via ballot-polling or a comparison audit) that, if shown to hold with a given
degree of statistical confidence, confirms the reported election outcome with that
degree of statistical confidence. The algorithm finds the set of assertions requiring
the least anticipated number (ASN) of ballot checks to confirm. Table 5 shows
that while the ASN of the RAIRE audits is minimal – the actual level of auditing
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effort required by these audits will differ from these estimates, and may be greater
than that required by an EO, SE, or WO audit. For ballot polling audits the
discrepancy can be large. In these experiments we have not introduced any errors
or discrepancies between the electronic ballot records and the paper ballots. In
this setting, the ASN computed for a ballot-level comparison audit accurately
represents the actual number of ballot checks or polls made during the audit.
In all but one of the elections in Table 5, RAIRE is able to compute an audit
configuration in less than 1 minute. The algorithm requires between 0.003s and
106s to find an audit configuration in the ballot-polling context, and 0.002s to 139s
in the comparison audit context. The most time consuming instance is the 2014
Oakland Mayoral election, with RAIRE requiring 106s and 139s to find the best
ballot-polling and comparison audit, respectively.
In 22/26 of the elections in Table 5, the ballot-polling audit generated by
RAIRE required a similar number of ballot samples to that of the best alternate
method (EO, SE, or WO). In the remaining 4 instances, the RAIRE audit was
significantly more efficient. Consider instances 12 and 13 – the Oakland 2012 City
Council election for District 3, and the Pierce 2008 County Assessor election. For
these instances, neither the EO, SE, or WO methods were able to avoid a full
recount. The RAIRE audits were able to confirm the reported outcomes in these
elections by sampling no more than 17% of the cast ballots, on average. The
comparison audits generated by RAIRE are significantly more efficient than their
ballot-polling counterparts, across our suite of election instances.
Consider instance 17 in Table 5 – the Aspen 2009 City Council election.We can,
with a RAIRE comparison audit, confirm the reported outcome (with risk limit
α = 5%) by sampling just under 10% of the cast ballots (254 ballots), on average.
If we were to isnstead use one of the EO, SE, or WO approaches of conducting
a comparison audit, we would need to sample just under 83% of the cast ballots
(2112 ballots), on average. Table 5 also shows that as the γ parameter increases,
the number of ballots checked in a comparison audit may increase slightly, but not
significantly. This parameter has more influence on selecting an initial sample size
when sampling ballots in batches Stark (2010).
We have shown that RAIRE is able to find efficient ballot-polling and ballot-
level comparison audit configurations across a range of example elections, in the
context where electronic ballot records exactly match their corresponding paper
ballot. In Appendix A, we consider the effectiveness of our audits in the setting
where varying numbers of errors (or discrepancies) are introduced into the re-
ported (electronic or digitised) ballot records. We show that even when there are
discrepancies between actual and reported ballots: comparison audits are still more
efficient, in general, than their ballot-polling counterparts; and RAIRE is able to
generate efficient audits that sample only a small fraction of cast ballots.
8 Conclusion
We have presented and evaluated several methods for conducting ballot-polling
and ballot-level comparison RLAs for IRV elections. These approaches represent
the first practical techniques for conducting RLAs for IRV. As in FPTP, we find
that comparison-based IRV audits are, in general, more efficient than their ballot-
polling counterparts. These audits typically require only a small fraction of cast
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ballots to be sampled, though very close elections (with a MOV that is less than
1% of cast ballots, for example) generally require a full manual recount. We have
presented an algorithm, RAIRE, for designing efficient ballot-polling and ballot-
level comparison RLAs for a given IRV election. This algorithm finds a collection
of assertions to audit that require the least number of expected ballot checks to
confirm (assuming the announced outcome is correct), while still guaranteeing
that a wrong result with be detected with a probability of at least 1 − α. The
audit configurations generated by RAIRE are competitive with alternate methods
considered in this paper, and in some cases are substantially more efficient.
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Auditing using RAIRE via ballot-polling (BP) and comparison (CP) audits, α = 5%
BP CP
Best Alt. RAIRE Best Alt. γ = 1.1 γ = 1.1 γ = 1.2 γ = 1.3
# |B| EO/SE/WO EO/SE/WO RAIRE RAIRE RAIRE
Method Polls % Polls % ASN % Method Polls % Polls % ASN % Polls % ASN % Polls % ASN %
1 4,682 EO 3.9 5.4 4.7 SE 0.9 0.9 0.9 1 1 1.1 1.1
2 5,333 WO 0.8 0.9 0.9 WO 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5
3 14,040 WO 0.3 0.3 0.3 WO 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2
4 43,661 EO,SE 1.8 1.5 1.4 SE,EO 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
5 159,987 EO,SE 0.2 0.3 0.3 SE 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.1 0.1
6 2,544 EO 52.7 28.1 46.9 SE 3.7 3.7 3.8 4 4.1 4.4 4.4
7 6,426 WO 0.8 0.6 0.6 WO 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3
8 5,708 WO 3.8 1.6 2.7 WO 0.9 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.8
9 13,482 EO 7.3 5.2 6.7 SE 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.8
10 312,771 EO,SE 7.6 13.9 9.8 SE,EO 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
11 28,703 WO 0.8 0.8 0.6 WO 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
12 26,761 – ∞ 14.2 13.1 SE,EO 14.6 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 1 1
13 312,771 – ∞ 17 22.7 SE,EO 2.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4
14 23,494 EO,SE 92.9 87.6 ∞ SE 2.8 2.8 2.8 3.1 3.1 3.4 3.4
15 57,492 WO 0.1 0.1 0.1 WO 0.1 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.1
16 23,884 WO 0.6 0.6 0.5 WO 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
17 2,544 – ∞ ∞ ∞ SE 82.4 9.4 9.5 10.2 10.3 11.1 11.1
18 122,268 SE 15 15.3 15.5 SE 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4
19 101,431 WO 0.5 5.4 0.1 WO 0.4 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04
20 149,465 WO 0.01 0.01 0.01 SE,WO 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
21 79,415 WO 0.3 0.2 0.2 WO 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
22 46,952 WO 3.7 3.2 1.9 WO 0.7 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
23 45,124 WO 0.9 0.8 0.7 WO 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
24 48,259 – ∞ ∞ ∞ SE 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.5 3.5 3.8 3.8
25 47,698 WO 0.5 0.5 0.3 WO 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
26 42,747 SE 1 1.3 0.7 SE 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Table 5: Comparison of the best ballot-polling and ballot-level comparison audit methods across 26 IRV elections. We compare the
average number of ballot samples required (expressed as a percentage of total ballots cast) by the best alternate ballot-polling or
comparison audit methods (EO, SE, and WO) and those generated by RAIRE. The notation∞ indicates a percentage of ballots (or
ASN) greater than 100%.
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A RAIRE in elections with discrepancies
We introduce discrepancies between reported and actual ballots according to a defined error
rate, which we vary between 1% and 5%. This means that for any given ballot, there is a 1%
to 5% probability that its electronic version differs, in some way, from the paper version. The
electronic record of a paper ballot is a partial or complete sequence of candidates, ordered
according to voter preference. We introduce an error in a reported ballot record with one of
the following operations: replacing a randomly selected candidate in this preference ordering
with a randomly selected candidate that does not appear in the ordering; inserting a randomly
selected candidate that does not appear in the ordering into a randomly selected position;
flipping the positions of two randomly selected candidates in the ordering; and removing a
randomly selected candidate in the ordering. For each reported ballot, we introduce an error
with a probability equal to the error rate. When introducing an error, we uniformly randomly
choose one of the above manipulations to perform.
In this setting, we simulate each auditing approach 50 times – with 10 different seeds used
to inject errors into electronic (reported) ballot records, and 5 seeds used to randomly draw
(sample) ballots during the audit. When reporting the ASNs and actual number of ballots
sampled by each auditing method, we average these values over the 50 simulated audits.
Tables 6 to 8 report the ASN and actual number of ballot samples required, on average, across
the simulation of varying types of audit in each of our 26 elections, with a 1% to 5% error
rate, α = 5%, and γ = {1.1 . . . 1.3}. We compare the EO, SE, and WO auditing methods, in
both a ballot-polling and comparison audit context, against the audits generated by RAIRE.
Tables 6 to 8 show that even when there are discrepancies between actual and reported
ballots: comparison audits are still more efficient, in general; and RAIRE is able to generate
efficient audits that sample only a small fraction of cast ballots. Across Tables 6 to 8, we bold
the audit with the lowest average number of ballot polls required when simulated (expressed
as a percentage of total ballots cast).
As the rate of introduced errors increases toward 5%, the ASNs associated with the compar-
ison audits generated by RAIRE significantly underestimate the actual auditing effort required
in a small number of instances. This is the case in instances 10 (Pierce 2008 County Execu-
tive), 13 (Pierce 2008 County Assessor), 14 (San Leandro 2010 Mayor), 17 (Aspen 2009 City
Council), 18 (Oakland 2010 Mayor) and 24 (Gosford NSW 2015). The MOV in each of these
elections is less than 1% of the total ballots cast.
Our results indicate that for very close elections, with a very small margin of victory, the
impact of each discrepancy encountered in the sampling of ballots has a significant influence
on the statistics being maintained throughout the comparison audit. Recall that the MACRO
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Auditing using RAIRE via ballot polling (BP) and comparison (CP) audits, α = 5%, 1% errors
BP CP
Best Alt. RAIRE Best Alt. γ = 1.1 γ = 1.1 γ = 1.2 γ = 1.3
# |B| EO/SE/WO EO/SE/WO RAIRE RAIRE RAIRE
Method Polls % Polls % ASN % Method Polls % Polls % ASN % Polls % ASN % Polls % ASN %
1 4,682 EO 3.7 3.8 4.8 SE 0.9 0.9 0.9 1 1 1.1 1.1
2 5,333 WO 0.9 0.9 0.9 WO 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5
3 14,040 WO 0.2 0.2 0.3 WO 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2
4 43,661 EO 1.2 1.3 1.5 SE,EO 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
5 159,987 EO 0.4 0.4 0.3 SE 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.1 0.1
6 2,544 EO 36.2 36.2 48 SE 3.8 3.8 3.8 4.3 4.1 4.6 4.5
7 6,426 WO 0.6 0.6 0.6 WO 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4
8 5,708 WO 1.3 1.5 2.7 WO 0.9 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.8
9 13,482 EO 4.5 6.2 6.7 SE 0.9 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.7 0.8 0.8
10 312,771 EO 16.8 17.8 9.1 SE,EO 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
11 28,703 WO 0.9 0.7 0.6 WO 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
12 26,761 – ∞ 12.3 13.2 SE,EO 62.4 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 1 1
13 312,771 – ∞ 12.9 24.1 – ∞ 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.4
14 23,494 EO 87 90 ∞ SE 4.3 4.3 2.8 4.3 3 4.3 3.3
15 57,492 WO 0.2 0.2 0.1 WO 0.1 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.1
16 23,884 WO 0.5 0.6 0.5 WO 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
17 2,544 – ∞ ∞ ∞ SE 98.6 12.6 9.6 13.1 10.5 13.7 11.3
18 122,268 SE 26.3 16.3 14.9 SE 0.6 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4
19 101,431 WO 0.6 0.3 0.1 WO 0.5 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04
20 149,465 WO 0.01 0.01 0.01 SE,WO 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
21 79,415 WO 0.3 0.2 0.2 WO 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
22 46,952 WO 3.9 2.1 1.9 WO 0.9 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
23 45,124 WO 0.7 0.7 0.7 WO 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
24 48,259 – ∞ ∞ ∞ SE 16.3 16.3 2.9 11.4 3.1 10 3.4
25 47,698 WO 0.3 0.4 0.3 WO 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
26 42,747 WO 1.2 1.2 0.7 SE 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Table 6: Comparison of the best ballot-polling and ballot-level comparison audit methods across 26 IRV elections, with an error rate
of 1% used to manipulate reported ballots. The average # of ballot samples required (expressed as a percentage of ballots cast) by
the best alternate method (EO, SE, and WO) and those generated by RAIRE are compared. The notation∞ indicates a percentage
of ballots (or ASN) greater than 100%.
30 Michelle Blom1, Peter J. Stuckey2, Vanessa J. Teague1
algorithm of Figure 3 repeatedly samples ballots until a running Kaplan-Markov MACRO
P-value (PKM ) falls below the given risk limit α. When we discover a discrepancy that has
resulted in the margin between a winning and losing candidate being overstated (i.e., thought
to be larger than it actually is), this PKM statistic increases at a rate that is proportional to
the inverse of the election MOV. For elections with a very small MOV, each discovered error
may significantly increase the ASN of the audit. In these instances, a full manual recount is
likely to be required (and indeed, the announced outcome may be wrong).
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Auditing using RAIRE via ballot polling (BP) and comparison (CP) audits, α = 5%, 3% errors
BP CP
Best Alt. RAIRE Best Alt. γ = 1.1 γ = 1.1 γ = 1.2 γ = 1.3
# |B| EO/SE/WO EO/SE/WO RAIRE RAIRE RAIRE
Method Polls % Polls % ASN % Method Polls % Polls % ASN % Polls % ASN % Polls % ASN %
1 4,682 SE 3.7 3.8 5 SE 1 1 0.9 1.1 1 1.1 1
2 5,333 WO 0.9 0.9 0.9 WO 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4
3 14,040 WO 0.2 0.2 0.3 WO 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.2
4 43,661 SE 1.2 1.3 1.6 SE,EO 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
5 159,987 SE,EO 0.4 0.4 0.3 SE 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.1 0.04 0.1 0.1
6 2,544 EO 36.2 36.2 49.7 SE 3.9 3.9 3.8 4.4 4.2 4.7 4.6
7 6,426 WO 0.6 0.6 0.7 WO 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4
8 5,708 WO 1.3 1.5 2.8 WO 0.9 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.8
9 13,482 EO 4.5 6.2 6.9 SE 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.8
10 312,771 SE,EO 18 18.2 8.1 SE,EO 0.7 0.7 0.2 0.5 0.2 0.5 0.2
11 28,703 WO 0.9 0.7 0.6 WO 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
12 26,761 – ∞ 12.3 12.6 EO,SE ∞ 1.2 0.8 1.2 0.9 1.2 1
13 312,771 – ∞ 13.2 27.2 EO,SE ∞ 1 0.3 0.8 0.4 0.7 0.4
14 23,494 SE,EO 87.1 90 ∞ SE 19.1 19.1 2.8 11.8 3.1 9.2 3.3
15 57,492 WO 0.2 0.2 0.1 WO 0.1 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.1 0.1
16 23,884 WO 0.5 0.6 0.5 WO 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
17 2,544 – ∞ ∞ ∞ – ∞ 17.6 9.7 16.6 10.5 16.8 11.4
18 122,268 SE 16.4 16.4 13.2 SE 19.5 0.8 0.3 0.6 0.3 0.6 0.4
19 101,431 – ∞ 0.3 0.1 WO 0.6 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.1 0.04
20 149,465 WO 0.01 0.01 0.01 SE,WO 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
21 79,415 WO 0.3 0.2 0.2 WO 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
22 46,952 WO 4.3 2.1 1.9 WO 1.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
23 45,124 SE,WO 0.7 0.7 0.7 SE 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
24 48,259 – ∞ ∞ ∞ SE 76.8 76.8 2.3 69 2.5 62.3 2.7
25 47,698 WO 0.3 0.4 0.4 WO 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
26 42,747 WO 1.2 1.2 0.7 WO 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Table 7: Comparison of the best ballot-polling and ballot-level comparison audit methods across 26 IRV elections, with an error rate
of 3% used to manipulate reported ballots. The average # of ballot samples required (expressed as a percentage of ballots cast) by
the best alternate method (EO, SE, and WO) and those generated by RAIRE are compared. The notation∞ indicates a percentage
of ballots (or ASN) greater than 100%.
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Auditing using RAIRE via ballot polling (BP) and comparison (CP) audits, α = 5%, 5% errors
BP CP
Best Alt. RAIRE Best Alt. γ = 1.1 γ = 1.1 γ = 1.2 γ = 1.3
# |B| EO/SE/WO EO/SE/WO RAIRE RAIRE RAIRE
Method Polls % Polls % ASN % Method Polls % Polls % ASN % Polls % ASN % Polls % ASN %
1 4,682 SE,EO 3.7 3.7 5 SE 1.1 1.1 1 1.1 1 1.2 1.1
2 5,333 WO 0.9 0.9 1 WO 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5
3 14,040 WO 0.2 0.2 0.3 WO 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2
4 43,661 SE,EO 1.3 1.3 1.7 EO 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.2
5 159,987 SE,EO 0.4 0.4 0.3 SE 0.1 0.1 0.04 0.1 0.04 0.1 0.1
6 2,544 EO 36.3 36.3 50.7 SE 5.5 5.5 3.9 5.4 4.3 5.6 4.6
7 6,426 WO 0.6 0.6 0.7 WO 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4
8 5,708 WO 1.4 1.5 2.9 WO 1 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.7 0.8 0.8
9 13,482 EO 4.5 6.2 7 SE 1.1 0.9 0.7 0.9 0.8 0.9 0.8
10 312,771 SE,EO 18.5 18.5 7.1 SE,EO 18.8 19.7 0.1 1.4 0.2 0.7 0.2
11 28,703 WO 0.9 0.7 0.6 WO 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
12 26,761 – ∞ 12.3 13.2 – ∞ 1.3 0.9 1.3 0.9 1.3 1
13 312,771 – ∞ 13.3 30 – ∞ 27.1 0.3 2.7 0.4 1.4 0.4
14 23,494 SE 86.3 89.5 ∞ SE 58.8 58.8 2.6 40.5 2.8 26.4 3
15 57,492 WO 0.2 0.2 0.1 WO 0.1 0.04 0.04 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
16 23,884 WO 0.5 0.7 0.5 WO 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
17 2,544 – ∞ ∞ ∞ – ∞ 22.1 10.2 19.6 11.1 19.3 12.1
18 122,268 SE 25.7 16.5 12.1 – ∞ 2.6 0.3 1.1 0.3 0.9 0.4
19 101,431 WO 0.7 0.3 0.1 WO 0.7 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.1 0.04
20 149,465 WO 0.01 0.01 0.01 SE,WO 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
21 79,415 WO 0.3 0.2 0.2 WO 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
22 46,952 SE 3.2 2.1 1.9 SE 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.2
23 45,124 SE 0.7 0.7 0.7 SE 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
24 48,259 SE 97.9 97.9 ∞ SE 90.1 90.1 1.9 92 2 87 2.2
25 47,698 WO 0.3 0.4 0.4 WO 0.2 0.08 0.08 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
26 42,747 WO 1.2 1.2 0.7 WO 0.5 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1
Table 8: Comparison of the best ballot-polling and ballot-level comparison audit methods across 26 IRV elections, with an error rate
of 5% used to manipulate reported ballots. The average # of ballot samples required (expressed as a percentage of ballots cast) by
the best alternate method (EO, SE, and WO) and those generated by RAIRE are compared. The notation∞ indicates a percentage
of ballots (or ASN) greater than 100%.
